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The Right of Federal Security Agencies to Control the
Private Lives of Their Employees-Some Recent

Developments
In 1972, Congress was confronted with several crucial decisions concerning the
extent to which the federal government may be allowed to control the private
lives of its employees.' Perhaps the most hotly debated issue of this controversy
is whether the security agencies (CIA, NSA, FBI 2 should be completely exempt
from legislation proposed to limit this control. Thus far, these agencies have
successfully avoided limitations on their power, but there is growing recognition
that the employees of the security agencies are entitled to some measure of
protection from arbitrary action.
Recently, public 9pinion has been thoroughly aroused by several examples
of flagrant agency abuses' which were widely reported in the news media. In a
I. Proposed legislation considered by Congress includes the following:
(a) Senate Bill 2466 and Senate Resolution 163 which are intended to counter the
newly reactivated Subversive Activities Control Board, 117 CONG. REC. 19068-72 (daily
ed. Nov. 19, 1971).
(b) House'Bills 7199 and 7969 which have been drafted to prevent violations of first
amendment rights of federal employees.
2. The Cf,, NSA, and FBI have been collectively designated as "the security agencies" in the
published Hearings on H.R. 7199 and Related Bills Before the Subcommittee on Employment
Benefits of The House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., (1971).
3. The following two examples received much comment in the news media and are illustrative
of the kinds of abuses with which this article is concerned.
In September, 1970, FBI agent Jack Shaw was pressured into resigning "with prejudice" after
the FBI discovered a letter written by Shaw which contained criticisms of the bureau's director.
The intended recipient of the letter was Dr. Abraham Blumberg, the professor of a graduate course
Shaw had just completed at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City.
The letter was a response to what he considered to be inaccuracies in the professor's classroom
characterization of the bureau. While generally supportive of the FBI and its activities, it admitted
that a personality cult existed around its director. The stigmatizing effects of a resignation "with
prejudice" proved to be a substantial impediment in his subsequent search for employment. Shaw
filed suit to have this "taint" removed from his record and the Government, realizing the difficulty
of its position, settled out of court. In a further reaction to criticism, Hoover ordered fifteen of his
agents who were enrolled in Professor Blumberg's class to withdraw from the John Jay College
(from a television program, Interview with Jack Shaw, former FBI Agent, NEw JERSEY SPEAKS,
WNET-TV, Feb. 16, 1971).
Thomas Carter, a 26 year old file clerk in the FBI's Washington headquarters, was discharged
for "conduct unbecoming an employee of this bureau," after the bureau discovered that Carter's
girlfriend, while visiting from Texas, had occupied his room with him for two nights during her
stay in Washington. The bureau became apprised of these events when it received an illiterate
complaint from a writer whose identity is still unknown.
The stigma of an adverse dismissal was reduced due to the efforts of Carter's two roommates
and fellow employees who explained the reasons for his dismissal to a prospective employer, thus
allowing Carter to secure a position with a local bank. However, their support of Carter along with
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number of instances, the employee who has sought a legal remedy has been
successful.' The Government has granted concessions when it realized that the
courts are willing to intervene to protect employees whose basic rights have been
unnecessarily abridged. This, however, is the result of some recent developments
in the law which have rejected a long-standing judicial policy of non-interference
in the affairs of governmental agencies. This article will consider those recent
cases which have brought about the demise of the right/privilege doctrine and
the rise of the substantial interest doctrine; the influence of these cases on the
security agencies; the influence of Executive Orders Nos. 11,491 and 11,605;
and the impact of legislation regulating government employees' privacy.
Recent Judicial Developments
This policy of judicial non-interference was based upon the "right/privilege
doctrine," a theory which asserts that public employment is a mere privilege
rather than a right. This privilege may be withdrawn or denied for a reason
which might otherwise be considered a deprivation of an employee's constitutional rights. Perhaps the most cogent statement of this doctrine was made in
McAuliffe v. City of New Bedjbrd5 where Justice Holmes, speaking for the
Court, asserted:
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but
he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few
employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend
his constitutional right of free speech, as well as of idleness, by the
implied terms of this contract. The servant cannot complain, as he
takes the employments on the terms which are offered him.'
The right/privilege doctrine was not seriously questioned for half a century
following McAuliffe. It first became an issue in 1947, when President Truman
issued Executive Order No. 9835. The Order provided for the appointment of
a Loyalty Review Board for the purpose of identifying organizations which were
their failure to have reported the activities of their roommate at the time of his girlfriend's visit,
caused the bureau to initiate disciplinary action against them, which induced both to promptly
submit their resignations.
In 1970, Carter received a favorable out of court settlement as the result of his legal battle to
obtain the removal of the unfavorable stipulation on his employment record. Carter v. United
States, 407 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Carter's success, however, was due to the fortunate coincidence that he was an Air Force veteran, so that his employer, like any other federal employer, was
constrained by the provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service Act § 9(b-c), (g)(1),
50 U.S.C. § 459 (b-c), (g)(l), which forbids the discharge-except for cause-of a veteran for the
first year after he resumes civilian life.
4. Supra note I.
5. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
6. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-18.
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"totalitarian, Communist or subversive, or which had a policy approving force
or violence to deny others their constitutional rights or to alter the government
by unconstitutional means." 7 The members of these designated groups were
either to be discharged or refused employment by government agencies.
The leading case under the Order, Bailey v. Richardson,8 involved a federal
government employee who had been discharged because the Loyalty Review
Board found that "reasonable grounds exist for the belief that Miss Bailey is
disloyal to the Government of the United States." 9 In addition to being discharged, her eligibility for future civil service was denied for a period of three
years. Her complaint was that in the hearing before the Board, she had no
opportunity to confront or cross-examine the witnesses against her. A divided
Supreme Court affirmed without opinion' the decision of the Court of Appeals
that Miss Bailey had no right to trial because she had no right to public
employment. The District of Columbia Circuit had stated that, "due process
of law is not applicable unless one is being deprived of something to which he
has a right."" Furthermore, it stated that "to hold office at the will of a
superior and to be removable therefrom only by constitutional due process of
law are opposite and inherently conflicting ideas."'"
The court considered it irrelevant that her reputation was injured in the
process of her dismissal. It reasoned that:
If Miss Bailey had no constitutional right to her office and the
executive officers had power to dismiss, the fact that she was injured
in the process of her dismissal neither invalidates her dismissal nor
gives her the right to redress. 3
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Edgerton rejected the right/privilege doctrine
and commented that: "Dismissal for disloyalty is punishment and requires all
the safeguards of judicial trial."' He went on to say:
The premise that government employment is a privilege does not
support the conclusion that it may be granted on condition that
certain economic or political ideas not be entertained. 5
The companion case to Bailey, Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
7. Exec. Order No.9385,3 C.F.R. 627 (1943-48 comp.).
8. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
9. Id. at 50.
10. 341 U.S. 918(1951).
II. 182 F.2dat 58.
12. Id. at 58.
13. Id. at63.
14. Id.at 69.
15. Id. at72.
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McGrath," also included a challenge to the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 9835. In this case, the Committee protested the procedure by which it was
labeled a Communist organization. The Court, without rendering a majority
opinion, determined that the label had injured a legally protected right of the
plaintiff and that this designation could not be made without providing for the
appropriate procedural safeguards. In his concurring opinion, Justice Jackson
decided that the right/privilege doctrine was not controlling. He remarked:
"The fact that one may not have a legal right to get or keep a government post
17
does not mean that he can be adjudged ineligible illegally."'
A year later in Weiman v. Updegraff,8 the Supreme Court held that a state
statute violated the due process clause because it required the dismissal of any
state employee who belonged to a Communist front organization whether or
not he was aware of its subversive goals. The majority explained:
We need not pause
employment exists.
tion does extend to
a statute is patently

to consider whether an abstract right to public
It is sufficient to say that constitutional protecthe public servant whose exclusion pursuant to
arbitrary or discriminatory. 9

The Court emphasized the stigmatizing effect of a dismissal based on disloyalty
when it declared:
There can be no dispute about the consequences visited upon a person excluded from public employment on disloyalty grounds. In the
view of the community, the stain is a deep one; indeed, it has become
a badge of infamy.20
While the right/privilege theory was being eroded, a new principle-the substantial interest doctrine-was emerging to take its place. This new doctrine
presumes that there exist basic constitutional rights which the government may
not abridge without showing that their infringement is necessary to protect an
important governmental interest.
Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy" presented the Supreme Court with an appropriate context in which to develop this new doctrine.
In Cafeteria Workers, the Court decided that Rachel Brawner, a civilian cook
at a defense installation, was not denied due process when her security clearance
was withdrawn without a hearing. However, the summary denial could not be
justified by the mere assertion that "because she had no constitutional right to
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

341 U.S. 123(1951).
Id. at 185.
344 U.S. 183(1952).
Id. at 192.
Id. at 191.
367 U.S. 886 (1961).
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be [in the plant] in the first place, she was not deprived of liberty or property
by the Superintendent's action.""2 The Court then identified the determinative
criteria:
[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under
any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of
the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of
the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.2"
After Cafeteria Workers, the right/privilege doctrine continued to decline
until 1967 when it was all but annihilated by the Court's decision in Keyishian
v. Board o] Regents. 21 In Keyishian, the Court overruled its decision in Adler
v. Board oJ Education5 and repudiated New York's complicated teachers loyalty scheme, which required the dismissal of those who had been guilty of
"treasonable or seditious words or acts. ' 26 The majority opinion stressed its
rejection of "the theory that public employment which may be denied altogether
may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable...-27 The
breadth of Keyishian's repudiation of the right/privilege doctrine was apparent
in the Court's sweeping declaration that "[iut is too late in the day to doubt
that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of
or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege." ' 9,
In Pickering v. Board of Education,21 the Court further elucidated the substantial interest doctrine and provided an example of its application. Pickering
dealt with a school teacher who was fired when a local newspaper printed her
letter criticizing the Board of Education's approach to raising revenue for
public schools. The Court furnished the following guide to the use of the
doctrine:
The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen in commenting upon matters of
public concern, and the interests of the state, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees.3 0
After weighing the competing interests, the majority found that the teacher's
22.

Id.
at 894.

23. Id. at 895.
24.
25.

385 U.S. 589 (1967).
342 U.S. 485 (1952).

26. N.Y.

CIVIL SERVICE LAW §

(McKinney 1970).
27. 385 U.S. at 605-06.
28. Id. at 606.
29. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
30. Id. at 568.

105 (3) (McKinney 1959); N.Y.

EDUCATION LAW
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first amendment rights predominated. It explained:
In these circumstances we conclude that the interest of the school
administration in limiting teacher's opportunities to contribute to
public debate is not significantly greater than its interest in limiting
a similar contribution by any member of the general public."1
These recent Supreme Court decisions have provided the lower courts with a
mandate allowing them to enlarge the scope of judicial review of governmental
conduct. Three district court decisions demonstrate the extent of the lower
court's willingness to intervene to protect the victims of arbitrary government
action.
In McConnell v. Anderson,32 the district court found that a state university
had denied due process by refusing to hire a qualified librarian because of his
publicly announced homosexuality when the state had not shown that homosexuality would impair the performance of his duties.
In Burns v. Pomerleau,33 the district court found that the due process clause
prevented a municipal police department from refusing to hire a qualified applicant because of his declaration that he was a practicing nudist. As in the
McConnell case, the Burns court placed on the employer the burden of proving
that the practices objected to would impair the employee's performance on the
job.
In Castro v. Beecher,34 the court of appeals would not allow an applicant to
be refused a job as a police officer based on his failure to pass an intelligence
test. The court ruled that due process would not allow low test scores to be a
basis for this denial unless the state civil service commission could prove that
the test could validly predict an applicant's ability for police work.
To date, these cases represent the extent to which the judiciary has intervened
in the employment practices of federal and state government. However, Bagacki
v. Board of Supervisors35 illustrates the California Supreme Court's recognition
that this limit may not be extended indefinitely. In Bagacki, the plaintiff/employee unsuccessfully tried to shift his burden of proof to the municipal
employer. Had the court ruled in favor of the employee, the employer would
have been obliged to prove that valid reasons existed for an employee's
dismissal."

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
16

Id. at 573.
316 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970).
319 F. Supp. 58 (D. Md. 1970).
334 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971).
5 Cal. 3d 771, 489 P. 2d 537, 97 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1971).
5 Cal. 3d at 776. 489 P. 2d at 542, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
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The foregoing summary of developments in the law indicate that ample legal
precedent will soon exist so that employees who are victims of abuse by the
security agencies will have an adequate remedy. That such an inference is unfounded will be shown presently.
It must be emphasized that government employers are not required to achieve
their goals through a choice of procedures which are least destructive of individual rights." The substantial interest doctrine, as it is currently applied, requires
the interests of the individual to yield to any dominant governmental interest.
The government will prevail where the employer can insist that summary action
is necessary in order to protect national security. Thus, the intelligence agencies
dealing with employment practices may be allowed freedom of action. which
would clearly not be permitted to other government employers; and there is a
great potential for abuse where agency power is unchecked.
The Impact of Recent Developments on the Security Agencies
In the United States, the acquisition, processing and analysis of highly classified
intelligence data is done by a very large and diverse group of organizations. The
organizations purposely are not tightly joined and coordinated, and there is
considerable overlap in the functions performed by the various members. This
overlap allows the conclusions of one member to be checked against those of
another. These organizations, loosely referred to as the intelligence community,
are the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA), the Army, Navy and Air Force, the State Department's Intelligence and
Research Division (INR), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the
United States Intelligence Board (USIB), and the Treasury Department's Bu3
reau of Customs. 1
37. See Bruff, Unconstitutional Conditions upon Public EmploYment, 21 HAST. L.J. 129
(1969).
38. NEWSWEEK, Nov. 22, 1971, at 32. The functions of these organizations may be listed as
follows:
Primary Function
Name
National Security Agency (NSA)

Breaking foreign codes and
creating U.S. codes.

Defense Intelligence Agency

Attempting to coordinate the
work of Army, Navy, and
Air Force intelligence.

Army, Navy, and Air Force
Intelligence

Reconnaissance including spy
satellites. Receives over 80%
of the intelligence budget.

State Department Intelligence

Gathering and analyzing data
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Recent Supreme Court decisions emphasize the sensitivity of the employee's
position as a dominant factor affecting the measure of procedural safeguards
to which an employee is entitled. These cases are important when viewed in light
of the large number of employees who have access to government secrets. One
source has estimated the total intelligence budget at six billion dollars annua4l,
39
with a total employment of close to 200,000 persons.
In Cole v. Young, ° the Supreme Court stressed the nature of an employee's
position as a factor determinative of the requirements of due process. The Court
held invalid the summary dismissal of a federal food inspector pursuant to
Executive Order No. 10,450.11 That Order was authorized by the Internal Security Act of 1950.11 The Court explained:
[It] is difficult to justify summary suspension and nonreviewable
dismissals on loyalty grounds of government employees who are not
in sensitive positions and who are thus not situated where they could
bring about any discernible adverse effects on the nation's security. ... .13
In 1967, the Supreme Court made a similar distinction in United States v.
Robel. 4' It held that those sections of the Internal Security Act which denied
employment in defense plants to any members of the Communist Party were
invalid because they were overbroad. The Court, however, was aware of the
security problem and acknowledged the right of Congress to use narrowly
and Research Division (INR)

from service posts.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

Internal security including
surveillance of foreign agents.

Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA)

Analyzes inputs from its own
agents and also from the other
intelligence agencies; covert
promotion of U.S. interests abroad.

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)

Analyzes data on foreign
nuclear developments.

United States Intelligence
Board

An organization composed of
the above groups, which is
chaired by the CIA. It oversees the activities of the
intelligence community.

Treasury Department (Bureau
of Customs)

Concentrates on drug and
economic intelligence.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 29.
351 U.S. 536(1956).
3 C.F.R. 936 (1949-53 comp.).
50 U.S.C. §§ 781-98 (1970).
351 U.S. at 546.
389 U.S. 258 (1967).
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drawn legislation to deny sensitive positions to those who would use their positions to disrupt defense production.
In Cole and Robel, the Court considered the threat to national security as a
justification for the summary dismissal of defense plant employees who may
have access to classified information. In cases involving security agencies, the
interest of the United States is quite similar. However, in actual practice, the
two situations are treated differently. The courts are much more likely to grant
summary judgment in favor of a security agency without considering the sensitivity of the plaintiff employees' position.45
This difference in treatment between employees of security agencies and other
defense employees is due to those provisions of federal law which allow the
directors of the CIA and NSA to dismiss any employee in the interests of
national security" and also to the complete exemption of the FBI from the
provisions of the Civil Service Act. 7 However, there seems to be no logical basis
for this disparity unless security agency secrets are somehow considered more
important than Defense Department secrets. Notwithstanding the government's
interest in security, it is hard to justify the use of summary procedures if a
complete airing of the dispute would not require the disclosure of classified
information. In order to determine whether the holding of a trial would result
45. See note I, Carter v. United States, 407 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1968). In that case the District
Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the United States despite
the fact that the plaintiff employee was a GS-4 clerk who had no access to highly classified
information. The court of appeals reversed, and indicated that it would not have done so but for
the coincidence that the plaintiff was still covered by the Universal Military Training and Service
Act § 9(b-c), (g)(1), 50 U.S.C. § 459(b-c), (g)(l) (1970). The importance of the plaintiffs employer
to national security must have been of great significance. That the FBI is not subject to civil service
regulations should not be considered crucial. The McConnell, supra note 32, Burns, supra note
33, and Carter cases demonstrate the federal courts' willingness to curb a government employer
not subject to the Civil Service Act. Assuming that relief be granted in security cases, the next
question is should it be granted? An argument can be made that it should be granted because the
employer has tried to further castigate his employees by including the damaging stipulation on
their employment records. As early as 1961, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
had forbidden punitive action in summary procedures. The court in Bland v. Connally said that
the military services were free to dismiss anyone they wished, but they could not in a summary
manner ". . . introduce the element of punishment or labelling into the involuntary separation
by characterizing the discharge derogatorily." 293 F. 2d 852, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
46. The National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403 (c) (1949) and The Emergency
Detention Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 833 (1970) give the directors of the CIA and NSA respectively
the power to dismiss any employee when the directors consider such termination to be "in the
interests of the United States." This power is given notwithstanding the provisions of any other
law.
47. All positions in the FBI are excepted from the competitive service and the FBI may discharge its employees for reasons it chooses, subject only to constitutional limitations. 5
U.S.C. §§7501, 7512, 28 U.S.C. § 536.
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in a breach of security, the court should conduct a hearing in which the focus
is on the sensitivity of the employee's position as well as the nature of his
alleged misconduct. Of course, the agency should be present during the hearing
and be given adequate opportunity to prevent the disclosure of classified information.
Perhaps future decisions will incorporate these procedures so that the courts
require the intelligence agencies to justify the assertion of an inordinate degree
of control over the private lives of their employees. However, this does not seem
realistic as the present composition of the Supreme Court suggests that the
liberalizing trend has already reached its peak. 8 Thus, it seems that employees
of the security agencies rmust rely on legislative rather than judicial reforms if
they are to invoke legal sanctions to limit their employer's excessive control
over their private lives.
Executive Order No. 11,491-The Right to Bargain Collectively
In 1969, President Nixon issued Executive Order No. 11,4911 supplementing
Executive Order No. 10,988.50 Together, these promulgations establish the right
of employees of the Executive Branch of Government to organize and bargain
collectively with agency management.
Under Executive Order No. 11,491, a union agreement may include a procedure by which grievances may be resolved as long as such procedures comply
with the appropriate civil service regulations. This order might have provided
security agency employees (particularly those in non-sensitive positions) with a
means of combatting agency abuses but for Section 3(b), which exempts the
5
entire intelligence community .
When the collective bargaining process becomes more firmly rooted in government practice, it may well be that the complete exemption of the security
agency will be lifted. However, the agencies may still be able to frustrate the
objectives of this legislation by retaining an inordinate degree of control over
employee's choice of bargaining representative.
48. Mr. Justice Blackmun's first majority opinion for the Supreme Court in Wyman v. James,
400 U.S. 309 (1971) seems to have breathed some life into the remains of the right/privilege
doctrine.
49. Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 861(1966-70 comp.).
50. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-63 comp.).
51. § 3(b)(I)-(2) of Executive Order No. 11,491 specifically excludes the FBI and the CIA while
§ 3(b)(3) excludes "any other agency, or office, bureau, or entity within an agency, which has as a
primary function intelligence, investigative, or security work, when the head of the agency determines, in his sole judgment, that the Order cannot be applied in a manner consistent with national
security requirements and considerations."
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Executive Order No. 11,605-Reactivating the SA CB
Executive promulgations may operate to limit as well as expand on the rights
of government employees. The most notable recent example of such a restrictive decree is Executive Order No. 11,605.52 This 1971 promulgation amends
an earlier executive order (Executive Order No. 10,450)" to provide the Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) with increased authority to determine whether any organization designated by the Attorney General is:
totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, subversive, or which has adopted
a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force
or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution
of the United States or which seeks to alter the form of government
of the United States by unconstitutional means.54
Executive Orders No. 10,450 and No. 11,605 are successors to Executive Order
No. 9835,1 5 which established the Loyalty Review Board.
Congress provided legislative authority for Executive Orders Nos. 10,450 and
11,605 when it passed the Internal Security Act of 19506 to curb communist
subversion of American institutions. This Act set up the SAC B.57 Executive
Order No. 11,605 is largely an attempt to revitalize the SAC B and provide it
with new powers, since several court decisions following its creation had rendered it largely impotent.5"
Executive Order No. 11,605 poses a particular threat to the employees of the
security agencies because they are among those singled out for special consideration by the promulgation which it amends. This is because the scope and
intensity of the investigation conducted pursuant to this Order is directly proportional to the sensitivity of the position held by the person being investigated.59
52. 36 Fed. Reg. 12831 (1971).
53. Exec. Order No. 10,450,3 C.F.R. 936 (1949-53 Comp.).
54. Exec. Order No. 10,450 § 8(a)(5), 3 C.F.R. 938 (1953).
55. 3 C.F.R. 627 (1947).
56. 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-98 (1950).
57. 50 U.S.C. § 791 (1950).
58. In Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. I
(1960) measures of the Internal Security Act which imposed penalties on individuals on the theory
of guilt by association were held to violate the first amendment. In Boorda v. Subversive Activities
Control Board, 421 F.2d 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1969) provisions of the Internal Security Act which
allowed public disclosure, of an individual's membership in a subversive organization without proof
that the individual shared the illegal purpose of the organization, were held in violation of the first
amendment.
59. § 3(a) of Executive Order No. 10,450 requires that "the scope of the investigation shall be
determined in the first instance according to the degree of adverse affect the occupant of the position
sought to be filled could bring about by virtue of the nature of the position on national security
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It is hard to question the government's need for broad discretionary powers
when dealing with employees who occupy sensitive positions; but a general
denial of judicial review to every employee of the security agencies may not be
justified. In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath," Mr. Justice
Douglas addressed his concurring opinion to this problem when he commented:
The problem of security is real; and the Government need not be
paralyzed in handling it. The security problem, however, relates only
to those sensitive areas where critical policies are being formulated
or where sabotage can be committed.'
Executive Order No. 11,605 has come under attack in Congress where Senator Ervin has criticized it as having the effect of allowing the federal government
to "protect [American citizens] against thoughts or associations it deems dangerous, [and] to stigmatize its citizens for thoughts or associations it thinks
hazardous.""2 Senator Ervin opposes the provisions of the Executive Order
which increase the authority of the SAC B, for the following three reasons: (1)
that their promulgation was beyond the constitutional power of the President;
i.e., it is a direct violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; (2) that they
are void for overbreadth; and (3) that they violate the first amendment and due
process rights of all members of the organizations or groups designated except
those who share the illegal aims of the organization or groups. 3
In order to limit the effect of the Order, Senator Ervin introduced Senate Bill
246664 and Senate Resolution 16365 on October 5 and 7, 1971. Senate Bill 2466
"would make it unlawful for any employee of the Department of Justice or...
of the Subversive Activities Control Board to carry out or attempt to carry out
any of the additional functions, duties or powers which Executive Order 11,605
. . . purports to confer on the Board."" The bill also denies the use of any
funds appropriated by Congress to implement this Order. Senate Resolution
163 expresses the sense of the Senate that Executive Order No. 11,605 is an
'attempt to usurp the legislative powers conferred on Congress by
the Constitution' and is an 'infringement on the First Amendment
rights of all Americans.' It calls on the President to revoke the Order
.§3(b) of Executive Order No. 10,450 provides that all such sensitive positions in each
department shall be identified by the head of the department and such positions shall be occupied
only by persons "with respect to whom a full field investigation has been conducted."
60. 341 U.S. 123(1951).
61. Id. at 180-81.
62. 117 CONG. REC. 19,071 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1971).
63. Id.
64. S.2466,92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
65. S. Res. 163, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
66. 117 CONG. REC. 19,069 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1971).
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or 'amend or revise it to bring it into conformity with article I,
section I, and the First Amendment to the Constitution.'67
Notwithstanding the effects of these bills, the impact of Executive Order No.
11,605 may be blunted by court action such as that which nullified similar
orders. 68 In drafting Executive Order No. 11,605, however, an attempt was
made to correct the defects which had made previous promulgations targets for
litigation. The Order now contains a definition of each type of subversive
organization,69 although these definitions are themselves somewhat lacking in
precision.70 Also included are procedural safeguards such as the requirement of
a hearing before any organization may be designated as subversive, Communist, etc.71 In addition, before the government may take action against an individual, it must prove his knowing membership in a designated group or organization. 71 However, despite the presence of such safeguards, constitutional challenges to this enactment will undoubtedly be made.
The Privacy Bills
Privacy bills now being considered by Congress seem to offer employees of the
security agencies as well as employees of all the other executive departments the
best hope of limiting job related abuses. These bills have been introduced to
curb numerous and extremely varied invasions of privacy of federal employees.
These violations of employees' rights have been well documented by Senator
Ervin and include a range of activity which may be illustrated by the following
examples: (I) compelling employees to buy United States Savings Bonds; (2)
ordering them to lobby in their communities in support of specific pieces of
legislation or a particular political candidate; and (3) coercing them into painting fences and buying grass seed to be distributed in support of Mrs. Johnson's
beautification program.13 The security agencies have been guilty of some of the
most flagrant .abuses, including the subjection of their employees and job applicants to polygraph tests in which questions are asked concerning their most
67.

Id.

68. Supra note 58.
69. 36 Fed. Reg. 12831-32,§ 2 (1971).
70. Exec. Order No. 11,605 defines four categories of subversive organizations as those which
are engaged in various types of illegal activity. However, the enactment does not stipulate whether
the illegality is to be measured by federal or state law and definitions of these proscribed types of
illegal activity which are contained in state statutes may be extremely vague. See "sedition" as
defined by GA. CODE § 86-791(2-3) (1971).
71. 36Fed. Reg. 12831,§ 2(1971).
72. Id. at§ I.
73. Hearingson H.R. 7199 and Related Bills Before the Sub-Comm. on Employee Benefits of
the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 42-67 (1971).
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intimate sexual activities7 4 Some of the officers in these agencies apparently
think that in exchange for a salary, they have purchased the whole man and
not just his services. 7
In recent years, Senator Ervin has been the member of Congress who has
shown the most concern over these federal agency employment abuses. Senator
Ervin has proposed remedial legislation since 1966. From the time when Congress first showed interest in the privacy issue many government agencies have
been fearful of limitations on their power and have used their considerable
political influence to stifle or dilute proposed corrective legislation. In his testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Post Office and Civil
Service, Senator Ervin has acknowledged the role of political pressure7 in the
FBI's complete exemption from the legislation he has proposed. 77 He also gave
the following account of his experience with overt pressure from the CIA during
a vote on one of his earlier privacy bills:
I might say about the CIA, when this bill passed the first time, they
had several agents sitting up in the gallery coming down and calling
the senators out from the floor. I thought that maybe there was one
investigation that the FBI ought to conduct and that was whether
those gentlemen in the gallery were violating a law by trying to
7
influence legislation that way. 1
Senator Ervin has been successful in getting his current privacy bill approved
by a great majority in the Senate despite its coverage of the CIA and NSA.79
The major obstacle to the passage of the privacy bills has been the requirement
of approval by the House of Representatives Committee on Post Office and
74. A striking example of such activity involved a 25 year old NSA applicant. He was asked
the following questions while a polygraph measured his physiological responses:
When was the first time you had sexual relations with a woman? How many times have you had
sexual intercourse? Have you ever engaged in homosexual activities? Have you ever engaged in
sexual activities with an animal? When was the first time you had intercourse with your wife? Did
you have intercourse with her before you were married? How many times? S. REP. No. 91-873,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1970).
75. This attitude was demonstrated in the Shaw case, supra note 3, when John Malone, the
director in charge of the FBI's New York office, demanded the letter Shaw had written in confidence to his law professor. When this demand was refused on the basis that the letter was personal
property Malone retorted: "Mr. Shaw, you are an agent from the top of your head to the tip of
your toes. What you write, I want to make clear to you, is not your property. You are an agent.
What you write is our property." From an Interview with Jack Shaw, former FBI Agent, Television program, NEW JERSEY SPEAKS, WNET TV, Feb. 16, 1971.
76. Hearings on H.R. 7199, supra note 73, at 46.
77. S.1438,§ 9, H.R.7969,§ 9, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
78. Hearingson H.R. 7199, supra note 73, at 64.
79. In the 90th Congress, the Senate passed S.1438 with a 79 to 4 vote, and, counting absentees,
with the total approval of 90 members.
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Civil Service.s0 In May and June of 1971, this Committee held hearings on
Senator Ervin's bill (House Bill 7969) along with another privacy bill (House
Bill 7199), s' introduced by Representative Charles H. Wilson. The two bills are
very similar in content and in fact are identically worded with a few notable
exceptions. In the hearings before the House Post Office Committee, Representative Wilson gave the following description of the purpose of House Bill 7199
which may-apply as well to House Bill 7969: "1 am trying to establish judicial
and administrative remedies for certain violations of First Amendment rights
of citizens who may apply for federal employment or who may work for our
government.""2
The most significant differences between the two bills relate to the exemptions
given the security agencies and may be listed as follows: (I) Senator Ervin's bill
(H.R. 7969) provides a complete exemption of the FBI 83 while Representative
Wilson's bill (H.R. 7199) provides the same qualified exemptions for theFBI
as are provided for the CIA and NSA; (2) a provision in H.R. 7969 which is
not found in H.R. 7199 requires the employees of the CIA and NSA to exhaust
their administrative remedies before seeking relief from either the Board of
Employees Rights or the federal courts. "' This gives the agencies a period of
120 days after receiving a written complaint from the employee to take corrective action before the courts or the Board of Employees' Rights may intervene.
In addition to its complete exemption for the FBI, Senator Ervin's bill provides the CIA and NSA with three significant exemptions. These same exemp80. Senator Ervin's previous privacy bill S.1035 was defeated by this committee.
81. H.R.7199,92dCong., IstSess.(1971).
82. Hearings on H.R. 7199, supra note 73, at 26. Representative Wilson went on to describe
the provisions of H.R. 7199 as follows:
H.R. 7199 was designed to protect the federal employeeFrom being required to report his race, religion, or national origin.
From being compelled to attend indoctrination lectures or meetings unrelated to his job.
From being forced to take part in civic or other activities unrelated to his job, or from being
forced to report on his participation in any such activities.
From being required to submit to psychological interrogation or questioning with a polygraph
regarding family relationships, religious beliefs, or sexual relations.
From being compelled to support any candidate for elective office.
From being coerced into buying government bonds or contributing to any cause, however worthy; and
From being required to disclose his property, his sources of income, or his debts.
Moreover, H.R. 7199 would assure every federal employee the right to counsel in any proceeding
which might result in dismissal or disciplinary action. Further, it accords the right to civil action
in a federal court for violation or threatened violation of the act. Finally, it establishes a Board of
Employees' Rights independent of the Civil Service to hear complaints of violations of rights and
with authority to issue cease-and-desist orders to protect rights.
83. H.R.7969,§ 9, 92d Cong., lstSess. 1971.
84. Id. at § 7.
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tions which are granted to all three security agencies by Wilson's bill may be
described as follows: (1)a security agency may subject an employee to a polygraph test in which questions concerning personal, religious, or sexual matters
are asked if the agency director or his designee finds such information necessary
in the interest of national security;85 (2) authority is provided to the director of
each agency to protect or withhold information pursuant to statute or executive
order, and the determination of the director is conclusive on whether the release
of information sought will be inconsistent with such a statute or executive
order;"' (3) an employee who is under investigation for misconduct is permitted
to have counsel of his choice to an interrogation, but an employee of the security
agencies is limited in his selection of counsel to one who works for the agency
or who has been approved by the agency for access to the information involved.87 In addition to the exemptions provided in these bills, the CIA and
NSA would retain the benefits of 50 U.S.C. 403(c) and 50 U.S.C. 833, which
allow the agency directors to dismiss any employee when he deems it advisable
in the interests of the United States.
If political pressure is not taken into account, there seems to be little reason
for granting the blanket exemptions to the FBI while providing more limited
exemptions for the CIA and NSA. On the other hand, it does not appear
reasonable to deny such limited exemptions to the other members of the United
States Intelligence Board, 8 who share a great deal of secret information with
the three security agencies. It should be remembered that classified information
is only as safe as its least secure custodian.
H.R. 7199 and H.R. 7969, as presently drafted, satisfy any reasonable objections the security agencies have made thus far. Most of the objections to the
bills as currently amended indicate a failure to understand the provisions of
these bills.8 9
85. H.R. 7199, § 6,92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 7969, § 6, 92d Cong., IstSess. (1971).
86. H.R. 7199, § 7, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R.7969, §.8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
87. H.R. 7199, § (k), 92d Cong., IstSess. (1971), H.R. 7969, § l(k), 92d Cong., IstSess.
(1971).
88. Supra note 38.
89. In the House Post Office Comm. Hearings on H.R. 7199. supra note 72, at 30, an example
was suggested to demonstrate the crippling effect of the privacy bills on the security agencies. The
situation posed was that of a secretary who spent her working hours typing secret documents for
the FBI and who might attend meetings of a revolutionary terrorist action group at night. It was
suggested that section 1(d) of either H.R. 7199 or H.R. 7969 would prevent her from being
questioned regarding these outside activities. A careful reading of section I(d), however, would
indicate that the prohibition against making inquiries concerning an employee's outside activities
only applies to activities not related to the employee's job. In this instance, the secretary's membership in such an organization would unquestionably relate to her employment, as the entire mission
of her employer is the maintenance of national security. Most other objections can be met in a
similar manner.
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Previously, the section dealing with Executive Order No. 11,605 placed emphasis on the importance of the government's interest in matters relating to the
national security. That interest is no less vital in the context of privacy legislation. When considering whether every conceivable objection has been satisfied,
one must balance the interests of the individual against those of the government.
The individual interest has been described by Justice Brandeis as "the right to
be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men.""
The effectiveness of this proposed legislation in eliminating abuses by the
security agencies is, however, at best only partial. The weakness of the privacy
bills lies in their failure to adequately cover a situation where the employee's
alleged misconduct is a product of his personal relationship with another individual" and the agency has received knowledge of misconduct from a source
other than the employee himself. In this situation, the employer could dismiss
or discipline the employee92 without having to violate the provisions of these
bills by asking the employee to submit a report covering his activities"3 or to
submit to an interrogation concerning these matters." The provision allowing
the employee to bring counsel to an interrogation which could lead to disciplinary action99 may afford some protection, but the exemption granted the security agencies dilutes its effect by limiting the choice of counsel to an agency
employee or one who has agency approval. It is obvious that an agency may
exert considerable influence over a counsel who is also its employee. Also, it is
unlikely to approve of an advocate who will assert his client's rights too vigorously.
A Proposed Solution
If the employees of the security agencies are to be afforded adequate protection,
they must have the opportunity to have their grievances reviewed by a tribunal
which is independent of their employer. This protection could be provided
90. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
91. § 1(b) of H.R. 7199 and H.R. 7969 only prohibits a federal agency from taking notice of
its employees' attendance or lack of attendance at any assemblage, discussion, or lecture. The bills
do not prevent the agency from taking notice of the employees' relationship with another
individual.
92. § I(b) of H.R. 7199 and H.R. 7969 makes it unlawful for a federal agency to dismiss or
discipline an employee by reason of the employees' failure to comply with any requirement or action
made unlawful by the act.
93. § l(d) of H.R. 7199 and H.R. 7969 would make it unlawful for a federal agency to ask an
employee to report on his non-job related activity.
94. § 1(e) of H.R. 7199 and H.R. 7969 would make it unlawful for a federal agency to
interrogate an employee regarding his personal relationship with any person connected with him
by blood or marriage.
95. § l(k) ofH.R. 7199and H.R. 7969.
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without sacrificing the vital interests of national security by the creation of a
special court. The exclusive function of this court would be to review the complaints of federal employees whose access to the regular judicial system would
be restricted because an ordinary trial would necessitate the public disclosure
of classified information. The jurisdiction of the special court should not be
limited to the three security agencies but should include the civilian employees
of the entire intelligence community.
In order to maintain the.court's requisite degree of independence from agency
control, judges who had no connection or responsibility to any intelligence
community employer would have to be appointed. These judges would, of
course, also have to obtain security clearances at a sufficient level so as to be
able to hear controversies involving any employee.
Deference to the interests of security would necessitate the use of procedures
which omit some of the usual safeguards that are present in a conventional trial.
For example, the traditional use of a jury in the role of fact-finder would require
an unacceptably large number of persons to be privy to the secret information
disclosed during the course of the trial. It would also be difficult to recruit
enough jurors who have appropriate security clearances to hear the matters
discussed and who, at the same time, have no relation to the defendant agency.
The trials would of necessity have to be held in camera in a secured area with
records sealed. Finally, the availability of appeal from the decisions of the
special court would be severely limited.
Despite these concessions to the interests of security, these special courts
would provide intelligence community employees with a meaningful review of
agency abuses which would be a clear improvement over the presently existing
remedies. For this reason, the existence of these courts would greatly benefit
the agencies by improving the morale of their employees. Also, careers in these
agencies would become more attractive so as to facilitate recruitment of the best
qualified personnel.
Conclusion
The legal developments which were summarized in the foregoing sections indicate an increased willingness of courts and lawmakers to supervise federal
agencies in their dealings with employees. It is important to note that the
agencies whose primary mission relates to intelligence have been granted the
greatest discretion in their employment practices. However, the authority to
terminate an employee for security reasons does not justify all abridgements of
his constitutional rights. The current trend in this area of the law is away from
the use of outmoded formalisms such as the right/privilege doctrine and toward
a more flexible criteria such as the substantial interest doctrine. Use of the latter
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doctrine makes the task of courts and the lawmakers more difficult in that they
must determine what action may legitimately be justified in the name of national security. In United States v. Robel"I and Cole v. Young9 7 the federal
government failed to demonstrate a threat to security which was sufficient to
justify a summary dismissal of employees who occupied nonsensitive positions.
The drafters of the privacy legislation carefully considered the interest of national security agencies while trying to give federal employees the increased
protection of the Bill of Rights. Executive Order No. I1,60511 places its emphasis proportionately on the sensitivity of the position whose occupant is being
investigated. Executive Order No. 11,49111 now provides a total exemption for
the entire intelligence community; however, it may be that once collective bargaining is well-rooted in government practice, some of its benefits may also be
provided for these employees.
While these current judicial and legislative trends indicate an increased concern for the rights of federal employees, the employees of security agencies may
still be denied a remedy when the agency decides that in the interests of security,
the employee must be denied access to the courts. What is really needed is a
special court which can hear these controversies without sacrificing security.
In future legislative and judicial determinations regarding the rights of employees of the security agencies, it is hoped that the decision-makers will not
lose sight of a significant interest of government that coincides with that of the
employees. The importance of this interest was emphasized by John Stewart
Mill, in his warning:
A state which dwarfs its men in order that they be more docile
instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes-will find that
with small men no great thing can really be accomplished. . .. 10
William W. Pugh
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
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36 Fed. Reg. 12831 (1971).
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